Normative Elegance vs. Behavioural Evidence - Negotiations with Incomplete Information under Time Pressure

Klappentext des Buches

Scholarly Paper (Advanced Seminar) aus dem Jahr 2003 im Fachbereich Wirtschaft - Volkswirtschaftslehre, einseitig bedruckt, Note: 1,4, 22 Eintragungen im Literaturverzeichnis, Sprache: Englisch, Abstract: Behavioural evidence of negotiations with incomplete information under time pressure and the underlying normative bargaining models are the core topics of this essay. First, the most important game-theoretical approaches to bargaining settings of the last decades are discussed: Nash’s axiomatic approach, Rubinstein’s sequential model and negotiation models with incomplete information. Building on this normative ideals, the second section focuses on empirical approaches to test negotiators’ behaviour under incomplete information and time pressure. Third, a further research path to negotiations with incomplete information under time pressure is developed. In the Appendix the ultimatum game is solved by a Bayesian-Nash approach.

GRIN Verlag
ISBN 978-3-638-65659-7, Paperback, 56 Seiten